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Introduction
In On the Genealogy of Morals (1887), Friedrich Nietzsche criticises the historians
of his time for confusing purposes with origins. It is a mistake, he says, to treat the
utility of a concept or practice as if it meant something regarding the origin of that
concept or practice, for ‘whatever exists,having somehow come into being, is again
and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by
some power superior to it’ (Nietzsche,1967:p.77).As Foucault will reiterate eighty
years later, Nietzsche states that the meaning and purpose of historical practices is
contingent upon the uses to which dominant power structures put them.Thus the
history of things and customs cannot be a story of progression towards a goal, but
rather the succession of multiple processes of the increase and decrease of power.
This can be seen as an early expression of postmodernism in history. It comes
from a philosopher whose aim was, in part, to shake up the practice of history,
particularly amongst late nineteenth-century historians of morality.For Nietzsche,
the history of moral values must begin by dismantling the assumption that moral
values of good and evil are fixed, necessary, and transcendent, and the assumption
that human beings are fundamentally rational, free, and progressing towards moral
perfection. Postmodern philosophy, or poststructuralism, has worked in the
Nietzschean tradition to displace metaphysical certainties – such as the free
subject, the truth of language, and the continuity of history – by arguing that their
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grounds are not fixed and permanent but contingent, shifting, and unstable.
This clears the way not for a crude relativism, but rather for new possibilities for
human thought and action. Postmodernism and poststructuralism do not pursue a
negative aim to destroy truth and to create a moral and epistemological void in
which ‘anything goes’. Rather, these movements have a positive project to affirm
the productive possibilities of disrupting and resisting fixed certainties, values and
oppositions.
It is much to their credit that both Callum Brown and Willie Thompson, in
their introductory books on postmodernism and history, recognise this positive
aim, without which postmodernism would be of little value to history, as its critics
frequently contend. Both authors make clear that postmodernism neither denies
that the past happened, nor propounds an ‘anything goes’ relativism about
historical interpretation. Both recognise that postmodernist theories have had
a major impact on the thinking of history in the last thirty years, linking to
progressive political positions that have opened history up to previously margin-
alised voices. On whether postmodernism has had a positive impact on history,
however, the authors are divided, with Brown stating in his opening sentence that
his book ‘promotes the use of postmodern theory in History’ and Thompson
declaring himself a sceptic. But what they set themselves up to be for or against is
a vastly oversimplified version of postmodernism as an intellectual movement.
While both books contribute to a broad understanding of the postmodern turn in
history, both miss much of what is genuinely new and interesting about post-
modernism,because the object of study has not been considered in enough depth.
The stated purpose of Brown’s book is to promote interest in postmodernism
amongst historians by giving ‘priority to demonstrating postmodernism as theory
and as applied method in History’ (p. 2).This is pursued through six core chapters
which in turn give summary accounts of key concepts: sign, discourse, post-
structuralism, text, self and morality.This expository purpose is in many respects
admirably achieved. Brown gives clear, concise accounts of a wide range of
postmodern theories in a way which should be accessible to any reader seriously
concerned to learn. In most chapters the application of these theories is illustrated
by recent historical work that draws upon them, significantly enriching the
argument. Each chapter also includes suggestions for students to incorporate
postmodernist methods into historical research. If exposition slides readily in to
advocacy, this is no great fault. Precisely because Brown has found postmodernism
so energising he conveys this enthusiasm to the reader, encouraging historians
to approach new topics and to try new methods without losing the rigour of
empirical research. Brown is an advocate for the cause, arguing that post-
modernism as ‘a way of understanding knowledge’ (p. 9) is responsible for ground-
ing progressive political positions such as feminism, postcolonialism, and queer
theory. Postmodernism, for him, is a method of rational thought that grounds
‘the humanistic desire for personal freedom’ (p. 150) and enables empiricist
historiography to work in the service of social equality.
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Thompson’s book takes a historical view of postmodernism, explaining in its
opening chapters how its theories developed and differ from those of modernist
philosophy and structuralism, and going on to examine in each chapter a different
problem of representation: emplotment, power, relativism, and metanarrative. Like
Brown,Thompson illustrates theory with examples of historical studies, but does
not offer suggestions for the student because he clearly opposes the adoption of
postmodernism in history.Thompson suggests that postmodernism has developed
nothing worthwhile that was not already achieved by Marxist social history or
indeed Rankean history. The theoretical positions that remain, those unique to
postmodernism, are, in his view,‘a Bad Thing, inimical to rational thought and to
the future of historical study’ (p. 5). This view sets the tone for a book almost
wholly antagonistic to postmodernism and its practitioners in history.
There is much to be said for an illustrated thematic approach when it comes to
introducing postmodernism. But both writers take absolutely the wrong starting-
point in uncritically maintaining the value of rational thought, for this is precisely
what postmodernism questions.Thompson is, ironically, right that postmodernism
is ‘inimical to rational thought’, not because postmodernism is nonsense (as he
strongly suggests it is), but because it seeks to show that the claim of rational
thought to be foundational for truth and action is illusory, and thus to undermine
the uncritical use of this accepted concept. Related to his claim that post-
modernism grounds a notion of personal freedom, Brown asserts that post-
modernism has a moral agenda to dismantle ‘immoral’ structures and to ‘re-centre
the individual as agent of action’ (p. 78). Brown is, broadly, correct that post-
modernism aims at progressing a certain concept of human freedom, but it does
this on the basis of a thorough critique of the fixed and foundational nature of
concepts of subjectivity, freedom, progress, and moral value.
The problem with both these books is that they largely ignore the philosophical
thrust of postmodernism and take it to be little more than a method, derived from
literary and cultural studies, for critical reflection upon the practice of history.
While it is correct to call postmodernism a set of practices rather than a fixed body
of thought, these practices are not simply interpretive tools to be deployed along-
side traditional empirical methods within the discipline of history. As practices,
they present a new way of thinking about thinking, and create new solutions to
problems: postmodernism is properly philosophical in that sense. But when post-
modernism is equated with the watered-down version of it presented by cultural
studies, its failings and contradictions become all too apparent. Postmodernism
becomes, for Thompson, a straw man, and for Brown, a set of methods to be
deployed in empirical research. Brown’s aim is laudable, and his is the superior of
the two books in that it recognises the progressive possibilities of postmodernism
as a practice, and explains them in clear, practical language.Thompson,by contrast,
is prevented by his distrust of difficult texts and his antagonism to theory from
engaging in meaningful critical dialogue with postmodernism.Thompson’s book
has the undoubted merit of outlining the historical development of postmodernist
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ideas, but beyond that virtue, its fundamental hostility to philosophical and indeed
theoretical thinking makes it of limited interest to those who want to take such
thinking seriously. In what follows, therefore,we concentrate most of our attention
on Brown’s book, which offers the positive engagement that Thompson does not
deliver.
There are three broad themes under which these two books might be discussed.
For brevity these can be listed as ‘the politics of postmodernism’,‘postmodernism
and enlightenment’ and ‘postmodernity, modernity and reality’. These three
narratives have much in common, but can be summarised and problematised
separately.
1. The politics of postmodernism
Both Brown and Thompson are centrally concerned with the politics of
postmodernism: that is, the fact that postmodernist positions have tended to be
associated with left-wing politics. For Brown, postmodernism is the basis of a
progressive political freedom, whereas for Thompson, it leads to a dangerous
relativism about scientific and political issues.
Brown is clear that the defining character of postmodernism is epistemological.
Its ‘two core principles’ are that ‘reality is unrepresentable in human forms of
culture’ and that ’with an inability to represent reality, no authoritative account
can exist of anything’ (pp. 6–7). This is coupled to the strong assertion that
‘postmodernism is not an ideology. It is not like Marxism, or liberalism, or
conservatism, or fascism … however, postmodernism does have ideological
implications. It enables a whole host of ideologies to exist.These include feminism,
postcolonialism,gay liberation and queer theory’ (p.8, italics in original).This huge
assertion, that certain epistemological positions ‘enable’ a set of ‘progressive’
political agendas, is the political metanarrative of the book. It is a connection
which is never justified at length, but the key term in asserting the link seems to
be ‘essentialism’ (e.g. pp. 65, 87, 118, 124).
The central argument is that non-progressive politics (racism, sexism, etc.) rely
on notions of human essences which postmodernism has undermined, and hence
that postmodern epistemology leads directly to anti-racism, anti-sexism, etc. But
this will not do. Racism, sexism and all other non-progressive causes are not fixed
entities that uniformly rely on ‘essentialising’ humans. Of course some versions
of ‘sexism’ or anti-feminism do depend on notions of women’s eternal essence;
but many do not. Friedrich Hayek’s anti-feminism, for example, while never
argued through, seems to rest on a Burkean-style reverence for established social
norms, as against any ‘abstract principle’, essentialist or otherwise. In other words,
essentialism is only one possible ground for reactionary political positions.
Furthermore, it is surely the case that an adherent of postmodernist epistemology
can also be an advocate of reactionary causes. For example, imperialism can and
has been defended not on grounds of essential differences between the inhabitants
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of metropolitan countries and their empires, but because of contingent historical
accidents which gave the metropole economic, political, and social superiority
which it then had a ’mission’ to export to the colonies. However much one
may disagree with such arguments, they cannot be reduced to the product of
essentialism, and therefore cannot be refuted by postmodern (or indeed any other)
epistemology as Brown presents it.
Despite Brown’s disclaimer noted above, postmodernism in this book does
function as an ideology in the sense that it provides ‘off the shelf ’ answers to
political problems according to some limited number of guiding principles.This
produces an implicit Utopian politics, because the implication of the ‘essentialist’
argument is that if we all shared postmodern epistemological views we could all
support a happy progressive consensus (‘Democracy is based on the absence of a
single past. … Relativity thus becomes … the very basis of political freedom’
(p. 149)). But epistemology is not so powerful a political weapon, or to put it the
other way about, political positions are not emanations of singular epistemological
principles. To suggest that epistemology and politics have this straightforward
linear relation is, in fact, to ignore the complexity of Foucault’s argument that
political power determines epistemic functions of truth, reality, and morality
and enables them to hold sway, just as epistemic conditions are the condition of
possibility of the rise of certain power structures.What is missing from Brown’s
account is an analysis of how postmodernism understands the complex causal
relations between epistemic positions and political and ideological power.
Brown’s assertion that postmodernism is the ground of liberal values also cannot
stand without further critical scrutiny. He claims that postmodernism grounds
human freedom, social equality, and individual action – and yet, at the same time,
postmodernism for Brown is supposed to subvert the concepts of Enlightenment
modernity.The problem that postmodernism both undermines and makes use of
historical concepts of progress, freedom, and action is intrinsic to postmodernism
and has been well discussed in the literature, not least by Foucault himself (see his
essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’). But Brown declines to take up this problem, and
instead makes postmodernism the epistemic ground for a liberal project to increase
social justice. Unfortunately, this means that Brown’s position gives itself over to
Thompson’s critique: casting postmodernism as the ground of liberal values leaves
Brown open to the charge that in terms of its politics, postmodernism is not
relevantly different from Marxism or, for that matter, classical Millian liberalism.
This is a shame, because Thompson’s position that the political gains of post-
modernism can equally be achieved through a Marxist approach is untenable.
Postmodernism does indeed bear a debt to Marx. But in attempting to reduce
what is good in postmodernism to a variant of Marxist social theory,Thompson
misses the point: postmodernism’s closeness to Marx cannot be separated from its
critique of fixed concepts of society and political action. Where Thompson
recognises postmodernism’s rejection of Marxist concepts and ideals, he criticises
its inattention to the concrete suffering of the oppressed, its invalidation of the
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concept of class, and its slide into a dangerous political groundlessness (e.g. pp.
45–9, 51–5, 91–6, 100–2).Thompson here confuses the rejection of a fixed ideal
with the rejection of real experience. Postmodernism recognises inequalities and
realises that ideologies that claim to be fixed and foundational will never succeed
in undoing those inequalities.The liberal ideal of ‘perpetual peace’ has no place in
a postmodern politics, but strategies to move beyond fixed oppositions and power
relations certainly do. (For a good discussion, see Williams 2005, pp. 18–22).The
fact that postmodernism wants to produce new ways of thinking about political
and social relations – ways beyond the static oppositions of oppressor and
oppressed, for instance – does not mean that postmodernism opposes democracy
or treats oppression and violence as merely ‘linguistic constructs’ (Thompson,
p. 54). Rather, postmodernist thinking works, in the spirit of Marx, to improve
political structures through recognising and resisting relations of power. It is,
as James Williams puts it, a matter of ‘keeping democracy alive through creative
transformation’ (Williams, 2005: p. 21).
2. Postmodernism and Enlightenment 
The second metanarrative identifiable in both books is one concerning the
‘Enlightenment’. Both Brown and Thompson follow many postmodernist critics
in their characterisation of the Enlightenment as ‘the modern that postmodernism
revolts against. It is the other of postmodernism; not only that which preceded
postmodernism but that in opposition to which postmodernism defines itself as
discovery and new beginning’ (Gordon, 2001: p. 1). Brown pulls no punches in his
characterisation of the negative side of the Enlightenment: ‘the Enlightenment
stands accused of intellectualising (not necessarily originating) some of the key
problems of the world from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries’
(p. 24, emphasis in original). He goes on to list almost every reactionary political
position as part of this indictment, from social elitism and belief in the gender
division of labour through to imperialism. Thompson similarly states that post-
modernism ‘delights in stigmatising [the Enlightenment] as the source of all or
most modern horrors and intellectual errors’ (p. 110). Given that postmodernist
philosophers such as Foucault have explicitly stated that the Enlightenment is not
to be dismissed in this way (‘we must free ourselves from the intellectual blackmail
of ‘being for or against the Enlightenment’’ (Foucault, 1984: p. 45)), what are we
to make of this indictment?
In passing we can note – as Thompson also does – that it is not an argument
peculiar to postmodernism. Adorno and Horkheimer’s modernist Dialectic of
Enlightenment saw an even straighter road from the philosophes to the gas chamber
than do most postmodernists. Indeed, as discussed in the previous section, philo-
sophical postmodernism questions such linear interpretations of the causal relation
between political positions and epistemological principles. Politics cannot be
reduced to a philosophical ‘moment’. Furthermore, philosophical postmodernism
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recognises that to set up a simplistic opposition between ‘bad’ Enlightenment
values and ‘good’ postmodern ones is to settle back into the fixed concepts and
oppositions that it is seeking to undo. Taking the Enlightenment to be a stable
body of concepts with particular moral values attached to them misrepresents the
Enlightenment, even from a non-postmodern perspective. As recent discussions
have shown in relation to questions of gender, for example, the Enlightenment was
much more ambiguous than simplistic postmodernist accounts of the justification
of women’s subordination allow (see, e.g., Johns’‘Reproducing Utopia’ in Gordon,
2001). Mary Wollstonecraft’s progressive stance on women’s education is just
as much a product of Enlightenment discourses of freedom and rationality as
Rousseau’s reactionary stance (see, e.g., Johnson, 2002). Similarly, simplistic post-
modernist accounts often take issue with Enlightenment notions of ‘progress’ that
supposedly assert the superiority of the present over the past. But notions of
‘progress’ don’t have any necessary relation to a sense of current superiority.The
most compelling (if still inescapably problematic) contemporary and modernist
notions of progress are those relating to ‘Human Development’, measured by a
combination of income, longevity and education. These indices show un-
ambiguous, albeit uneven and far from universal ‘progress’,most strikingly amongst
women. (UN Development Programme, 2004). In the name of what progressive
principle should we abandon such ‘post-Enlightenment’ notions of progress?
It is, surely, one of the ironies of some postmodern approaches to history that
they deploy such simplistic, unitary notions of ‘the Enlightenment’ which both
modern historiography and postmodern philosophy have done so much to
destroy. Philosophical postmodernism does not reject but works to open up
‘Enlightenment’concepts such as reason, freedom,and progress. It does not say that
those concepts are empty, useless, or bad, but rather shows that those concepts
cannot have the foundational function within a fixed system of concepts that they
have long been assumed to have. Foucault, for instance (who is rightly positioned
as a key figure in both these texts) wants to show that teleological progress cannot
be foundational for history, but that a sense of progress out of political oppression
can and must be retained. The complexity of this position, and the seeming
problem of retaining ‘foundational’ concepts that originate in Enlightenment
thought is what makes the relation between postmodernism and the Enlighten-
ment so interesting. Indeed, the key Enlightenment method of critique – gaining
understanding of a concept through an investigation into its conditions of possi-
bility – is the common root linking Enlightenment thinkers such as Wollstonecraft
and Kant with modern and postmodern ones such as Nietzsche, Adorno and
Foucault. As Foucault makes clear in ‘What is Enlightenment?’, we have to
understand the historical limits of the Enlightenment, while recognising it as
inescapably constituting where we start from.
There is direct evidence of this dynamic in Brown’s central claim that while
postmodernism is critical of empiricism as a philosophy of knowledge, it is
compatible with empiricist historical method. Brown makes the case effectively,
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against the impending charge of relativism, that adopting a postmodernist way of
thinking about the past need not involve a rejection of ‘older’ empiricist methods
for finding out about events of the past. But surely the connection between
empiricist methods and Enlightenment empiricism reveals something interesting
about postmodernism: that it both critiques and makes use of concepts from the
Enlightenment in productive ways. Unfortunately, neither Brown nor Thompson
engages with the richness of this problem, which should be of central interest
to historiography. Brown and Thompson both, in common with many post-
modernists, are too quick to reject the Enlightenment as the immoral ‘other’ of
postmodernism, and thus miss a chance to think critically about the problems
of casting a historical body of thought in this light, and about the debt that
postmodernist thinkers bear to the thinking of the past.
3. Modernity, Postmodernity, and Reality
The third metanarrative concerns postmodernity. Brown defines this as ‘the
intellectual, social and moral condition that superseded modernity at some point
in the twentieth century (probably in the 1960s). It is characterised by a rejection
and subversion of some of the key intellectual, social and moral principles of
Enlightenment modernity’ (p. 8) Thompson defines it more startlingly as ‘an
alleged basic shift in social and cultural reality occurring from the latter part of
the twentieth century’ (p. 133). Clearly, then the notion of postmodernity as a
historical epoch plays off a notion of a preceding modern period based on
Enlightenment principles. Some of the problems of this should be evident from
the previous discussion.The notions of modernity/postmodernity treat historical
epochs as emanations of intellectual shifts. This may be seen as open to the
withering criticism of the ‘expressive totality’ which Louis Althusser divined in
the early Marx. In such totalities, every feature of society can be analysed as the
expression of an inner societal principle, and one in which these ‘expressions’
constitute the conditions of existence of the totality.This seems a close parallel to
notions of ‘modernity’ and postmodernity in which certain intellectual principles
both act as conditions of existence of, and emanations from, a principle. Again,
critical discussion of the problems of postmodernist thinkers (including Foucault,
with his famous ‘epistemes’) failing fully to escape the concept of historical epochs,
especially in determining ‘postmodernity’ as such an epoch, would have been
valuable. Where Thompson does discuss this, his preoccupation with Foucault’s
admiration for Freud and Deleuze and inadequate treatment of the French
Revolution gets in the way of critical engagement (pp. 77–82).
Postmodernity, it seems, is characterised by both authors as emanating from a
rejection of a notion of ‘reality’ that modernism holds dear. It is around the concept
of ‘reality’ and its purported rejection that much of the criticism of postmodernism
has centred. Thompson, here, is decidedly on the offensive, claiming that post-
modernism ‘denies the validity of the concept’ of reality (p. 134) and seeks to
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demonstrate that it is primarily linguistic (p. 120) and thus has no moral or
epistemological foundation on which to rest its claims. On a related point, he
suggests that the shift of focus from reality to discourse in postmodernist texts
reveals its failings in the meaninglessness of their wilfully obscure prose.Thompson
is,of course,wrong on all these points.Postmodernism does not deny the existence
of reality. Like nearly all good philosophy, postmodernism finds traditional
accounts of reality to be wanting and therefore poses anew the question of what
reality is.The fact that it cannot come up with a stable and fixed answer to that
question is not evidence of its vacuity, but rather evidence that reality cannot be
constituted in thought as a stable identity.Far from denying the existence of reality,
postmodernist philosophers are utterly intoxicated with it (see Foucault’s The
Archaeology of Knowledge and Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, two detailed studies
of the nature of concrete reality). As to Thompson’s assertion that difficult texts
must be meaningless, philosophers like Derrida, Lyotard and Delueze (in common
with Kant, Hegel,Wittgenstein, and many others) have difficult and new ideas to
express, often about the nature of language itself. Derrida’s use of ‘playful’ forms
of writing in deconstruction, for instance, is not evidence of intellectual laziness,
but rather of the utmost rigour in the analysis of texts and their metaphysical
background (see Williams, p. 28).
Brown is far more accurate than Thompson when it comes to discussing ‘reality’
in postmodernism, but the problems in his own account centre on his ascription
of moral positions to modernity and postmodernity.As the previous quote shows,
Brown sees the Enlightenment as having a characteristic morality, and post-
modernity likewise. But these principles remain extraordinarily general and
under-specified, especially notions of ‘equality’ (p. 155) about which, of course,
rivers of ink have been used up without turning the idea into a simple principle
of morality in the way notions of a ‘postmodernity’ founded upon it would seem
to require.The link between postmodernity and a ‘humanistic desire for personal
freedom’ (p. 150) similarly remains undefined or discussed. Underlying this is
perhaps the problem that an epistemological principle of ‘uncertainty’ (p. 149)
cannot logically be the basis of an overarching morality. A chapter is devoted to
morality, but seems to be predicated upon the idea that the Enlightenment and
modernity presupposed that morality could be derived from historical experience.
Against this, Brown claims that postmodernism ‘argues that morality is divorced
from empiricism. It argues that there can be no logical recourse to the past as an
empirical resource by which to justify a moral position’ (p. 144). But the object of
this polemic is obscure; nowhere are we told who has claimed that morality could
be derived from empiricism,which would surely be a strange position for even the
most benighted modernist. In any case, Brown’s suggestion that postmodernism
itself has ‘a moral task’ (p. 153) based on relative values and individual choice is
misleading. It bears repeating that no philosophical postmodernist would claim
that a fixed moral system or concept of the free subject could be foundational for
thought or action, let alone for a historical epoch.
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Conclusion
Both Brown’s and Thompson’s books have their merits in introducing and
assessing the impact of postmodernism in history. But in using an oversimplified
sketch of postmodernism, the authors have cheated themselves and their readers
of critical engagement with the ideas and problems of this complex movement.
Postmodernism cannot be distilled to a series of methods to be applied without
losing what makes postmodernism distinctive and worthwhile.That Brown does
treat postmodernism as a set of methods leads to uncertainty about the intended
audience of his book.Despite being aimed at students, it is not clear that this book
would convince any student not already sympathetic to postmodernism to adopt
the methods it advocates. This is because Brown offers no argument as to why
postmodernist methods ought to be applied in history, beyond the problematic
claim that there is a linear relation between postmodern epistemology and
progressive politics. In contrasting modernist and postmodernist history, Brown
suggests that ‘the sense of righteous mission in European written History started
to wither in the mid-twentieth century’ (p. 150). Be that as it may, the meta-
narratives of this book convey a sense of ‘righteous mission’ which moves from
certain important and interesting epistemological principles to a ‘world view’
which conflates such principles with both political positions and the
characterisation of historical epochs.This seems unhelpful.
To the initiated, however,Brown’s book can serve as a useful reference point for
background, terminology, and guidance on historical projects. Brown’s endorse-
ment of the methods he describes – evident in his own historical work – is never
hidden, and his enthusiasm for his subject shines from every page. The advice
offered in each chapter from an experienced practitioner for ‘postmodernist’
research projects is practical, balanced, and realistic, and encourages students to see
their work in the context of an emerging body of such work. Students and
researchers open to postmodernist ideas and methods will find much of value in
Brown’s book.
The same cannot be said of Thompson’s book.Thompson is evidently opposed
to postmodernism; it might appear that he is also inimical to philosophical
thinking generally, as evinced both by his seeming unwillingness to work out the
arguments in complex philosophical texts and by his inability to offer any argu-
ment against them beyond snide remarks about their difficulty.Commenting upon
the obscurity of random passages from Of Grammatology, as Thompson does in his
first chapter, is no way to argue that Jacques Derrida is wrong or that his approach
is misguided. In place of argument,Thompson offers invective against the com-
plexity, difficulty, and ‘jargon’ of poststructuralist thinkers. In common with Sokal
and Bricmont – the physicists who ‘demolished’ the ‘pretensions’ of post-
modernism and who Thompson treats as high authorities (p.78) – Thompson takes
his inability to understand poststructuralist texts at first glance to be evidence of
their emptiness. The absurdity and the arrogance of such an attitude should be
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evidence enough that this book is not to be taken seriously.Any reader taken in
either by Thompson’s antagonism or by his adherence to Marxist social history
should keep in mind the Leninist dictum that in argument, as opposed to warfare,
one should focus on the enemies’ strongest points, not their weakest ones.
Thompson neither recognises nor addresses any of the strong points of the
philosophies he takes on; no student should be introduced to an intellectual
movement through the hostility and bad argument this book exhibits.
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Willie Thompson’s Response
I have to thank the editor and book review editor for inviting me to respond to
Beth Lord and Jim Tomlinson’s review of Callum Brown’s volume and my own.
Some important points are raised by the review, as well as a number of red herrings
dragged across the discussion. Much of the review is worth engaging with, even
on the basis of vehement disagreement, but when the authors come to sum up
then the sting – no doubt appropriately – is in the tail of the closing paragraph,
where Lord and Tomlinson turn quite venomous in their valuation of my own
volume. I will deal with this first, before addressing their more measured
arguments.
I do indeed have a high estimate of Sokal and Bricmont’s text. It is a pity that
the reviewers distort it so crudely with their sarcastic apothegm, ‘the physicists
who ‘demolished’ the ‘pretensions’ of postmodernism’. Sokal and Bricmont
emphatically do not set out to refute postmodernism as such – they themselves
insist on that point, and for precisely that reason Derrida and Foucault are
specifically excluded from their critique because these two, whatever their other
demerits, did not themselves indulge in the grotesque charlatanism of a number of
other eminent postmodernist authors abusing concepts drawn from physics,
mathematics and other ‘hard’ sciences; instances of ‘intellectual laziness’, as Lord
and Tomlinson put it, at its very worst.The celebrated Sokal parody, published in
unthinking seriousness by a renowned postmodernist journal, exposed all too
vividly the limitations of the postmodernist intellectual milieu.
I certainly would not accept, indeed I would forcefully challenge, their con-
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